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WHY CHRISTIANS SHOULD NOT BE DETERMINISTS: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SIN
Thomas Talbott
In response to Lynne Rudder Baker's intriguing paper, "Why Christians 
Should Not Be Libertarians," I suggest that, even if a Christian simply lets 
the chips fall where they may with respect to the dispute between libertar­
ians and compatibilists, a Christian should not be a determinist. I also offer 
for consideration a rather controversial non-Augustinian explanation for the 
near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin.
In an article that appeared in this journal a few years ago,1 Lynne Rudder 
Baker explained why, in her opinion, Christians should not be libertar­
ians, where a libertarian (in the philosophical sense) is someone who 
believes both that freewill exists and that freewill is incompatible with 
the deterministic thesis that every event has a sufficient cause. In particu­
lar, a libertarian thinks it impossible that a genuinely free choice should 
be the product of sufficient causes over which the choosing agent has 
no control. According to Baker, however, a Christian ought to reject this 
libertarian view in favor of compatibilism, the philosophical view that, 
contrary to what some might believe, freewill and determinism are quite 
compatible. And, not surprisingly, her main theological consideration, 
which she defended from an Augustinian perspective, was the traditional 
Christian understanding of predestination and salvation by grace.
Now, for my own part, I seriously doubt that St. Paul's understanding of 
predestination carried any implication of a rigorous overall determinism; 
indeed, as I have elaborated elsewhere, it seems to me that Paul provided 
a perfectly clear picture of how God could employ a person's uncaused 
moral choices, whichever way they might go, as a means of producing his 
predestined ends.2 But because compatibilism could be true even if the 
thesis of determinism should be false, and because indeterminism may 
seem to threaten freewill every bit as much as determinism does, I shall 
not here argue that Christians should adopt the standard libertarian un­
derstanding of either freewill or moral responsibility. Instead, I shall argue 
as follows: Whether or not a Christian can consistently be a compatibilist, 
consistently be a libertarian, or even consistently hold that the concepts 
of freewill and moral responsibility are ultimately incoherent, the Christian 
understanding of sin—the idea that sin stands in fundamental opposition 
to God's will for our lives—is nonetheless incompatible with a thorough­
going determinism. I shall then end the paper with a fairly controversial 
proposal concerning how to understand the near universality and seem­
ing inevitability of human sin.
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But first I want to compliment Baker for having distinguished carefully 
the Augustinian doctrine of predestination and salvation by grace from 
the Augustinian doctrine of limited election, the latter of which would 
restrict God's mercy and compassion to a chosen few. She thus wrote: "My 
suggestion is not to dilute the Augustinian doctrine of grace, but to em­
brace its content fully, while only expanding its scope."3 As a universalist 
myself, I wholeheartedly agree with such sentiments, even as I welcome 
Baker's tentative endorsement of Christian universalism. But even as a 
universalist, I hold that indeterminism plays a crucial role in creation, in 
the drama of human history, and in the process whereby God brings his­
tory to a glorious end through his providential control over it.
The Ultimate Cause o f  Sin
My most basic argument is not only relatively simple; it also clarifies why 
Augustine himself never embraced, not even after his controversy with 
Pelagius, a thoroughgoing determinism. For orthodox theology has always 
rejected the idea that God is the ultimate cause of sin. So if sin exists and 
God is not its ultimate causal source, then the thesis of determinism—and, 
in particular, the thesis that God determines, either directly or indirectly 
through secondary causes, every act of will—is false.
Now if this simple argument is sound, then, whatever the truth about 
compatibilism, Christian theology clearly requires a distinction that Baker 
appears to reject: the distinction between God's directly causing something 
and his permitting it.4 Suppose, by way of illustration, that indeterminism 
(of a genuinely random kind) really does exist at the quantum level and 
that no sufficient cause existed for a change of state that occurred yester­
day in a given radium atom. It follows that God did not causally determine 
this change of state. He nonetheless retained a kind of providential control 
over it in the sense that he could have prevented it. Were he, for example, 
to have annihilated the atom at a time prior to the uncaused change of 
state, or were he not to have created anything at all, he would have ef­
fectively prevented the event from occurring.5 God therefore permitted 
the event without directly causing it. Nor do we have any reason to deny, 
so far as I can tell, that God might permit an undetermined choice to go in 
one direction even though he might have preferred that it go in another.
Of course some in the Augustinian tradition do hold that God is the 
ultimate cause of all sin, including its original introduction into the uni- 
verse,6 and it appears as if Baker is at least sympathetic to such a view.7 But 
even the Reformed churches have typically rejected that view, however 
inconsistently, as heretical and dishonoring to God. The Canons of Dort, 
which are just about as Augustinian as you can get, thus declare that "The 
cause or guilt of . . . unbelief as well as o f  all other sins is no wise in God" 
(my emphasis),8 and the Canons go on to declare concerning Adam and 
his first sin:
His understanding was adorned with a true and saving knowledge 
of his Creator, and of spiritual things; his heart and will were upright, 
all his affections pure, and the whole man was holy. But, revolting 
from God by the instigation of the devil and by his own free will,
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he forfeited these excellent gifts; and in the place thereof became . . .
wicked . . . obdurate in heart and will, and impure in his affections.9
Even though this (rather standard) understanding of the first human sin 
seems to me philosophically untenable, not to mention exegetically unten­
able as an interpretation of the relevant biblical materials (see below), the 
clear motive here is to relieve God of both moral and causal responsibility 
for the corruption of the human race. Augustine himself was especially 
clear on the matter of causal responsibility: "How, then," he wrote, "can 
a good thing be the efficient cause of an evil will? How, I ask, could good 
be the cause of evil?"10 With respect to the fallen angels, Augustine also 
wrote: "If one seeks for the efficient cause of their evil will, none is to be 
found. . . . Thus, an evil will is the efficient cause of a bad action, but there 
is no efficient cause of an evil will."11 You cannot get much more explicit 
than that.
None of this, of course, will come as any news to Baker, who points out 
herself the following important feature of Augustine's thought: "Perhaps 
at creation, Adam had free will as the libertarians construe it, but the Fall 
destroyed it for Adam and his descendants."12 That seems to me a correct 
interpretation of Augustine's later view, though Augustine himself tended 
to express it rather confusedly. For Augustine often spoke as if the entire 
human race were itself a person who freely sinned against God, was con­
demned, and subsequently lost the freedom to act rightly. He thus wrote: 
"Man was . . . made upright, and in such a fashion that he could either 
continue in that uprightness . . . or become perverted by his own choice. 
Whichever of these two man had chosen, God's will would be done, either 
by man or at least concerning him."13 And again: "Thus it was fitting that 
man should be created . . . so that he could will both good and evil—not 
without reward if he willed the good: not without punishment, if he willed 
the evil."14 And finally: "For it was in the evil use of his free will that man 
destroyed himself and his will at the same time . . . . [Accordingly, the] sin 
which arises from the action of the free will turns out to be victor over the 
will and the free will is destroyed."15
Nor was Augustine alone in speaking of humankind in this way; one 
encounters similar expressions in a host of theologians and even in some 
of the creedal statements. (Long before they became politically incorrect, 
such statements as "Man was created with freewill," "Man sinned," and 
"Man was justly condemned" always struck me as category mistakes, 
because the term "man," when used to signify humankind, does not sig­
nify a concrete person with the power to make choices.) But in any event, 
Augustine took very literally the idea that we all sinned in Adam; and if 
we fail to appreciate this, we are apt to miss two important points. First, 
however confused his understanding of original sin might have been, 
Augustine never changed his mind on the question of whether God is 
the ultimate cause of sin. And second, even his defense of limited election 
rested upon an incompatibilist understanding of moral guilt.
Consider first his conviction that the human race corrupted itself with­
out any causal help from God. Not even when God hardens the hearts of 
the non-elect, blinds them, and confirms them in their evil ways is any ac­
tion of his a sufficient cause of their sin. For even here, Augustine insisted,
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God's actions are but a judicial response to an antecedent moral corrup­
tion that God himself did not causally determine. So the fu ll  explanation 
of any human sin, including one that results from God's having hardened 
a heart, will include a factor—namely, Adam's original sin and the subse­
quent corruption of the human race—for which God was not the sufficient 
cause. Put it this way: No human sin, according to Augustine, is the prod­
uct of sufficient causes that lie either in eternity itself or in the past prior 
to the time of Adam's first sin. Nor, as we have seen, is any non-human 
sin (in the fallen angels, for example) the product of antecedent sufficient 
causes either. According to Augustine, therefore, God is not the ultimate 
cause of any sin.
Beyond that, Augustine's whole defense of his doctrine of limited elec­
tion rested on an idea that virtually all compatibilists in the philosophical 
world reject: the idea of intrinsic desert,16 which entails that certain pun­
ishments (or certain rewards, as the case may be) are intrinsically fitting  
responses to certain actions. As a result of original sin, he argued, we are 
all part of a corrupt mass, are all guilty of a heinous sin against God, and 
are all such that we deserve to suffer everlastingly for our sin. Everlasting 
punishment, in other words, is the intrinsically fitting response to our sin­
ful condition, which is somehow "our" doing, not God's. The non-elect 
cannot justifiably complain, therefore, when God merely gives them the 
punishment they deserve. For "who but a fool," Augustine declared, 
"would think God unfair either when he imposes penal judgment on the 
deserving or when he shows mercy to the undeserving?"17 Applying this 
to the story of Jacob and Esau, Augustine went on to suggest that God 
"loved Jacob in unmerited mercy, yet hated Esau with merited justice."18 
His entire defense of limited election, then, rested upon the assumption that 
we are all morally responsible for a libertarian free choice (albeit Adam's 
original sin) that God himself did not causally determine. In Augustine's 
own words, "the whole human race was condemned in its apostate head 
by a divine judgment so just that even if not a single member of the race 
were ever saved from it, no one could rail against God's justice."19
Grace and Incom patibilism
The Augustinian understanding of limited election, which implies that 
even those who die as unbaptized infants will be eternally separated from 
God, is one that most Christian philosophers today would reject as both 
morally repugnant and inconsistent with the loving nature of God. And as 
I have already indicated, Baker suggests, correctly in my opinion, that we 
should divorce the doctrine of predestination and salvation by grace from 
this morally repugnant doctrine of limited election.
What some appear not to have appreciated, however, is that the Augus- 
tinian understanding of salvation by grace also rests upon an explicitly 
incom patibilist conception of moral responsibility. Have not Christians tra­
ditionally believed that, because they are saved by grace (or by God's causal 
activity), they can take no credit for their own salvation or even for a virtu­
ous character (where such exists)? Certainly Augustine held that view. For 
even as the hard determinists, who are also incompatibilists, reject the idea 
that we are morally responsible for actions whose sufficient causes lie in
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the distant past, so Augustine rejected the idea that we can credit ourselves 
for the work of God within and its consequences in our lives. He argued, 
in particular, that human beings have no power to save themselves—no 
power, apart from the grace of God, even to will the good—and hence that 
"neither does he who is saved have a basis for glorying in any merit of his 
own."20 Or, as St. Paul put it: "For by grace you have been saved through 
faith, and this [the faith] is not your own doing; it is the gift of God—not 
the result of works, so that no one may boast."21
Now remarkably, some recent Augustinians appear to be compatibilists 
with respect to one's responsibility for bad actions and yet incompatibil- 
ists with respect to one's responsibility for good actions. As a particularly 
instructive illustration, consider how the Augustinian, Bruce Ware, treats 
a person's decision in this life either to accept Christ or to reject him (what­
ever, exactly, either expression might mean). According to Ware, "those 
who reject Christ deserve the condemnation they receive, for they did 
what they most wanted in that choice to say 'no' to God's gracious offer of 
salvation."22 In the following quotation, moreover, Ware leaves little doubt 
that, like the early compatibilists, he regards doing what one most wants 
as a sufficient condition of being morally responsible for one's actions: 
"So long as those who reject the gospel act out of their own natures and 
inclinations, choosing and doing what they most want, . . . they are fully 
responsible for their actions."23 But if doing what one most wants is a suf­
ficient condition of being morally responsible for one's actions, should we 
not also conclude, by parity of reasoning, that those who accept Christ 
deserve moral credit for their faith, for their repentance, and for their 
willingness and to say "Yes" to "God's gracious offer of salvation"? Not 
according to Ware. For he immediately writes: "And those who receive 
Christ cannot boast at all [or even take any credit] in their receiving the 
eternal life that comes by faith . . . , for apart from God's effectual and gra­
cious work in their lives, to open their hearts . . . and their eyes . . . , they, 
too, would never have come."24 Ware thus agrees with Augustine that, 
apart from God's gracious work in their hearts, Christians are absolutely 
no different from those who reject the gospel. So if, according to Ware, 
all credit for salvation goes to God because he graciously regenerates the 
hearts of the elect, causing them to repent, it is surely fair to ask: Why 
should not all the blame for damnation likewise go to God, if he brings 
those who are eventually damned into an earthly existence, allows them 
to inherit a sinful nature not of their own generating and over which they 
have no control, blinds them to the truth, and causes them to he hard of 
heart? The question is especially acute for any Christian who, like Baker, 
appears to accept a fully deterministic scheme, but who also, unlike Baker, 
insists that God restricts his grace to a limited elect.
Still, given her apparent acceptance of determinism, even Baker must 
confront such questions as these: If God is the ultimate cause of both a 
good and an evil will,25 then how are we to maintain, if at all, the tra­
ditional Christian asymmetry between merited blame (in the case of sin) 
and unmerited favor (in the case of salvation from sin)? If God's being the 
ultimate cause of a person's bad will, as Baker seems to believe, does not 
transfer the blame for the bad will from the person to God, why should 
God's being the ultimate cause of a person's good will transfer credit for
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the good will from the person to God? And if Christians deserve moral 
credit for the transformed will that God brings about in them, why should 
they not take full credit for it? Arminians and other freewill theists typi­
cally try to account for the relevant asymmetry in the following way: Sal­
vation, faith, and a transformed heart, they insist, are themselves a gift 
that we have the power to refuse. So if we freely exercise our power to 
refuse the gift, then we have no one but ourselves to blame; but if we do 
not freely refuse the gift, we still are in no position to take moral credit 
for that which is essentially a freely offered gift. A strength of this Armin- 
ian view is that, unlike Baker's view, it does not make God the ultimate 
cause of sin. But a weakness, in my opinion, is that it takes no account of 
the New Testament idea that our natural unwillingness to be rescued is 
part of the very condition from which we need to be rescued. Nor should 
we liken Jesus Christ, I contend, to a lifeguard who throws a lifeline to a 
drowning swimmer, leaving it up to the swimmer whether or not to grasp 
the line; we should instead liken him to a lifeguard who drags an uncon­
scious swimmer, incapable of even grasping a lifeline, out of the water to 
safety. As Jesus himself put it, "And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, 
will draw [or drag in much the way that a fisherman uses a net to drag fish 
to shore] all people to myself."26
Now a Christian compatibilist might try to account for the asymmetry 
between merited blame and unmerited favor by taking literally Paul's as­
sertion that election and therefore salvation "depends not on human will or 
exertion, but on God who shows mercy."27 For the dispute between libertar­
ians and compatibilists is presumably relevant only to that which is, either 
directly or indirectly, the product of human will or exertion. So if, as Baker 
suggests, "No finite will, on either a compatibilist or a libertarian concep­
tion, has a causal role in bringing about salvation,"28 then it might seem as 
if those Christians who are libertarians and those who are compatibilists 
should be able to agree that salvation, at least, is not something for which 
we are entitled to credit ourselves. But unfortunately, such a move will not 
be of much help to a Christian compatibilist who believes that God is the 
ultimate cause of sin. For even if salvation (including belief, faith, and trust 
in God) is a gift that no human will "has a causal role in bringing about," 
it will nonetheless have effects in a person's life; a regenerated heart, for 
example, will most definitely shape a person's will and subsequent choices. 
So this leaves us with essentially the same question concerning these sub­
sequent choices: If Christian saints, those whose hearts God has regen­
erated, are not permitted to credit themselves for their virtuous choices, 
such as those involved in genuine repentance, why should sinners blame 
themselves for sins that God has also causally determined? And, alterna­
tively, if sinners are required to accept blame for sins of which God is the 
ultimate cause, why shouldn't Christian saints likewise credit themselves 
for virtuous choices of which God is the ultimate cause? At the very least, a 
Christian compatibilist who wants to maintain the traditional asymmetry 
between merited blame and unmerited favor owes us some explanation of 
why sinful choices and virtuous choices, where God is the ultimate cause 
of both, should be treated so differently from each other.
My own view, for what it is worth, is that Christians need to rethink the 
whole concept of moral responsibility in light of this remarkable fact: Both
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Jesus and Paul consistently rejected as inappropriate the very reactive at­
titudes upon which so many rest their understanding of moral guilt.29 
Personally, I doubt that the ideas of intrinsic desert and "metaphysical 
guilt" played a substantial role, if any at all, in their thinking. Yes, Paul 
explicitly stated in Romans 1:32 that those who commit certain sins are 
"worthy of death," and this may initially appear to imply that death is 
the intrinsically fitting punishment for sin. But the appearance is in fact 
misleading. For within the context of Pauline theology as a whole, the 
relationship between sin and death is clearly non-contingent. First, the rel­
evant death, which Paul elsewhere described as "the wages" (or the price) 
of sin30 and also as "the end" of sin,31 is spiritual death; it is separation 
from God and from the ultimate source of human happiness. Nor could it 
have been otherwise, because in sinning one precisely chooses death over 
life, separation over reconciliation. In Paul's own words, "To set the mind 
on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace."32 
So death, which is the unavoidable consequence of sin, is its intrinsically 
fitting punishment only in the sense that a painful burn is the intrinsically 
fitting punishment for intentionally thrusting one's hand into a fire.
Whatever position one might take on the issue of intrinsic desert and 
"metaphysical guilt," however, orthodox Christianity has always denied 
that God is the sufficient cause of either sin or its unavoidable conse­
quence, namely spiritual death. God is instead the "Great Destroyer" who 
destroys sin and death in the end and thereby rescues his loved ones from 
these two great enemies. But if that is true, how might we plausibly un­
derstand this matter?
Indeterm inism , Separation, and the M ystery o f  Created Personhood
Reflect for a moment on the context in which our earliest choices in fa c t  
arise. We all emerge as self aware beings and begin making choices in 
a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and misperception, and behind our 
earliest choices lie a host of genetically determined inclinations and envi­
ronmental (including social and cultural) influences. Beyond that, our in­
born instincts initially compel us as children to pursue, even as the higher 
animals do, our own needs and interests, as we perceive (or misperceive) 
them. Such a context comes close to guaranteeing, I should think, that 
we would all start out in life repeatedly misconstruing our own interests, 
given the Christian understanding of them, and repeatedly pursuing them 
in misguided ways; it comes close to guaranteeing, in other words, that we 
would repeatedly "miss the mark," which is the literal meaning of at least 
one Hebrew word for sin. For even if a small child's behavior manifests a 
good deal of causal contingency, as I believe it does, the absence of clar­
ity together with the child's other natural impulses virtually guarantees 
that it will at times act disobediently and in egocentric ways.33 That is the 
enduring element of truth, as I see it, in the traditional understanding of 
original sin—which, in my opinion, has nothing to do with inherited guilt. 
Because we are born into a context that virtually guarantees misguided 
choices almost from the beginning of our lives, particularly in the absence 
of firm and loving parental guidance, and because our choices (or quasi­
choices) made in ignorance34 begin shaping our character even before we
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are fully aware of what is happening to us, it is almost as if we were born 
with a bad moral character—or an "inherited" sinful nature,35 to use the 
theological term—not of our own choosing.
So how should a Christian who rejects both the idea of inherited guilt 
and the idea that our current condition is a punishment for Adam's original 
sin understand these matters? The answer lies, I believe, in the mystery 
of created personhood. Although creatures such as ourselves are clearly 
possible—we do, after all, exist—we know almost nothing about what is, 
and is not, metaphysically possible in the matter of creating independently 
rational creatures who are (a) aware of themselves as distinct from their 
environment and from other people, (b) capable of acting on their own and 
of making rational judgments concerning the best course of action, and (c) 
capable of learning from experience and from the consequences of their 
actions. It is easy enough to imagine an omnipotent being instantaneously 
creating a self-aware, language using, fully rational, and morally mature 
person who is capable of acting on his or her own, but I, for one, see no 
reason to think this metaphysically possible at all.36 My aim here, however, 
is not to defend my own convictions in this matter; it is instead to contrast 
two very different metaphysical pictures and two very different ways of 
explaining the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin.
Accordingly, as a contrast to the Augustinian explanation already dis­
cussed, let us now consider the radically different hypothesis that God had 
no choice, provided he wanted to create any persons at all, but to create 
them in much the way he in fact created us—that is, he had no choice but to 
permit their embryonic minds to emerge and to begin functioning on their 
own in a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and indeterminism.37 The sup­
position here is that in creating independent rational agents, or in bring­
ing them into being from the abyss, so to speak, God had to satisfy certain 
metaphysically necessary conditions of their coming into being, and these 
include what I shall call, for want of a better expression, an initial sepa­
ration from God. By this admittedly vague expression, I mean to imply, 
among other things, a severance from God's direct causal control on the 
metaphysical level and an experience of frustrated desire and frustrated 
will—the sort of thing that naturally leads to a sense of estrangement and 
alienation—on the psychological level.38 If these should be metaphysically 
necessary conditions of our creation, then our very creation would virtu­
ally guarantee39 the occurrence of error and misguided choices. So whereas 
the Augustinians hold that we would never have inherited our sinful 
dispositions and moral weaknesses, had Adam not failed his test in the 
Garden of Eden, our alternative hypothesis implies that these are, from a 
practical perspective, unavoidable consequences of conditions essential to 
our creation—that is, conditions essential to our emergence as individual 
centers of consciousness with an ability to make rational judgments and 
to learn for ourselves important lessons from experience and from the con­
sequences of our own actions. What some Christians will no doubt find 
controversial here, perhaps even heretical, is the further implication that 
our first parents came into being with the same sinful dispositions and 
moral weaknesses common to the rest of us.
Before addressing that issue, however, I want first to clarify a point 
and then to suggest some definite theological advantages, as I view them,
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in our alternative hypothesis. The point to be clarified is this: If creatures 
such as ourselves could never have em erged in a fully deterministic con­
text, then neither could human consciousness, human rationality, or hu­
man freedom have so em erged . But even if one were to grant all of this, a 
possible position would nonetheless be that our genuinely free actions, or 
perhaps the freest of all our actions, are fully determined by our immedi­
ate desires, beliefs, and reasonable judgments concerning the best course 
of action. So in no way does our alternative non-Augustinian hypothesis 
entail the standard libertarian conception of freewill. We are considering, 
after all, two different ways of explaining the near universality and seem­
ing inevitability of human sin, both of which reject the idea that we start 
out as free moral agents. Whereas the Augustinians try to explain this by 
appealing to the unavoidable effects of original sin in our lives, our alter­
native explanation appeals to the unavoidable consequences of conditions 
essential to our creation. It seems utterly non-controversial, moreover, that 
young children are not yet moral agents and therefore not yet fr e e  moral 
agents, however causally undetermined much of their behavior might 
be.40 But in addition to that, many traditional Christians, both inside and 
outside the Augustinian tradition, have believed that, with the one ex­
ception of Jesus Christ, all the descendents of Adam are already sinners, 
already "dead" in their "trespasses and sins,"41 from the very beginning of 
their moral consciousness. Such Christians typically take their cue from 
St. Paul, who described the context in which our moral consciousness first 
emerges as a kind of bondage or enslavement to the personified  powers 
of sin and death. Some of Paul's words—as when, for instance, he wrote: 
"For sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, deceived me and 
through it killed me"42—might even be taken to imply that sin is some­
thing that happens to us rather than something we do freely from the begin­
ning of our lives.
Now as I see it, our alternative non-Augustinian hypothesis has several 
advantages for Christians, and I shall here mention three—recognizing, 
of course, that others may not regard them as advantages at all. First, and 
perhaps most important of all, our alternative hypothesis enables us to 
abandon two unfortunate Augustinian ideas: that of inherited guilt and 
that of God's having punished  the entire human race for the sin of Adam. It 
enables us to abandon these ideas, moreover, without compromising the 
idea that, because sin and spiritual death threaten the very possibility of a 
life worth living, they are genuine enemies that God is bound by his own 
nature eventually to destroy. They are enemies in the sense that they stand 
in direct opposition to God's will for our lives.
Second, our alternative hypothesis also enables us to deny that God is 
the cause of sin even as we let the chips fall where they may with respect 
to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Just where 
the proverbial chips might fall will no doubt depend on a host of issues, 
such as the nature of moral guilt, the point of holding people morally re­
sponsible, and the question of alternative possibilities—issues that lie far 
beyond the scope of this paper. But wherever the chips might fall in this 
matter, it is perhaps worth pointing out that even a compatibilist such as 
Daniel Dennett appears to concede that a purposive agent's non-coercive 
control (or manipulation) of our desires, beliefs, and will is incompatible
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with genuine autonomy. Dennett thus distinguishes mere determinism from 
various non-coercive forms o f control, arguing that, however exhaustively 
it may determine our future, "the past does not control us," at least not in 
the way a purposive agent might. It does not control us in the latter sense 
because "there is nothing in the past to foresee and plan for our particular 
acts"; neither are there "feedback signals from the present to the past for 
the past to exploit."43 Remarkably, Dennett even concedes that a Laplacean 
"superhuman intelligence" that also determines the future could easily 
control us and would indeed undermine our compatibilist autonomy.44 As 
even Dennett appears to concede, therefore, not even compatibilist auton­
omy could exist in a theistic universe in which God causally determines 
every event.45
Finally, if our very creation requires an indeterministic process and 
therefore a causal break from the past, then we can accept both an impor­
tant claim that libertarians have made and an important objection to the 
standard libertarian analysis. We can accept, on the one hand, the libertar­
ian claim that none of our free actions are the product of sufficient causes 
that lie in the distant past. For if, thanks to the causal break at the begin­
ning of our own lives and the lives of our ancestors as well, none of our 
actions, not even the determined ones, are the product of sufficient causes 
that lie in the distant past, then neither are our free actions the product 
of such causes. We can also accept, on the other hand, the frequently ex­
pressed objection that indeterminism of any kind in the process of deliber­
ating and choosing introduces a degree of randomness, even irrationality, 
into it. The latter claim—which, so far as I can tell, no one has successfully 
refuted46—accords nicely with the idea that, although God is not its cause, 
sin is nonetheless something that happens to us early in life rather than 
something we do freely from the beginning of our lives.
Is my point, then, that the concept of freedom is simply incoherent? 
Not quite. Elsewhere I have suggested that a coherent account of freedom 
will involve two crucial ideas: first, that freedom, like moral responsibility 
and rationality, are a matter of degree, and second, that some of the very 
conditions essential to our emergence as free moral agents are themselves 
obstacles to a fully realized freedom—obstacles that can be overcome only 
after our incipient rationality has begun to function on its own and we are 
therefore capable of learning lessons for ourselves.47 Consider ignorance, 
for example. Many have suggested that our freedom in relation to God 
requires that we start out in a context where God remains hidden from us, 
and I agree. But for as long as God's true nature and very existence remain 
hidden from us, neither are we free to reject anything but a caricature of 
God; hence, we are not truly free in relation to God. And similarly for 
indeterminism: Even if our moral freedom requires that we start out in a 
context of indeterminism, as I believe it does, the randomness and irratio­
nality that indeterminism implies is nonetheless an obstacle to a fully real­
ized freedom.48 So perhaps Paul, who regarded freedom as a consequence 
of our salvation rather than as a precondition of it, had something to teach 
us about freedom after all. For according to Paul, our earliest moral expe­
rience arises from an emerging ability to understand moral rules (or the 
moral law), and it is inevitably an experience of the will in bondage to sin. 
Our salvation, therefore, consists in our being released from this bondage,
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so that our wills can be set "free from the law of sin and death."49 Put it 
this way: God can correct us and eventually transform us only after we 
have emerged as rational agents who can either cooperate in the process 
or learn important lessons from our refusal to cooperate.50
Still, whatever the perceived advantages of our non-Augustinian hy­
pothesis might be, some will no doubt object to its implication that our 
first parents came into being with the same sinful dispositions and moral 
weaknesses common to the human race as a whole. But as is now well 
known (thanks to John Hick in particular), St Irenaeus, the Bishop of Lyons 
between roughly 177 and 202 a .d ., did not view the first human sin as a fall 
from a higher state to a lower one. In that respect, his view was quite dif­
ferent from Augustine's, and I think it important to appreciate, first, how 
well the above non-Augustinian hypothesis comports with the Irenaean 
understanding of original sin, and second, how well the Irenaean under­
standing comports with the primary sources of the Christian faith.
Augustine verses Irenaeus on Original Sin
As Iranaeus understood it, Adam's initial sin arose in the first place for 
just this reason: Like every other child, he first emerged and began mak­
ing choices in a morally immature state. Iranaeus even went so far as to 
suggest that, when compared to the guardians of this world, namely the 
angels, Adam had a distinct disadvantage. For whereas the angels "were 
in their full development," Adam "was a little one; . . . he was a child 
and had need to grow so as to come to his full perfection."51 The serpent, 
Iranaeus declared, thus had little trouble in deceiving him: "the man was 
a little one, and his discretion still undeveloped, wherefore also he was 
easily misled by the deceiver" (my emphasis).52 As Iranaeus understood 
the first human sin, then, it was virtually an inevitable consequence of 
the unperfected condition in which our first parents initially emerged and 
started making choices. They may have started out as innocently as any 
other child—"their thoughts were innocent and childlike"53—but, like ev­
ery other child, they made their first moral choices in a context of ambigu­
ity, ignorance, and misperception, a context in which their judgment was 
already clouded and they had no clear idea of what they were doing. Their 
decision to eat the forbidden fruit, in other words, was no more a perfectly 
free choice, however causally undetermined it may have been, than the 
disobedient choices of a typical two year old are perfectly free.
Observe also how well this understanding of the first human sin com­
ports with both the actual story of Adam and Eve, as recorded in Genesis, 
and the New Testament commentary on it. So far as I can tell, not one 
word in the Christian Scriptures implies that our first parents were any 
less disposed to act in misguided and self-centered ways than their merely 
human descendants are; nor does anything there imply that someone 
not already in a "fallen" (or, more accurately, an unperfected) condition 
might nonetheless succumb to temptation and sin. Were not Adam and 
Eve subject to the same ambiguities, the same ignorance, and even the 
same delusions to which the rest of us are subject as well? Like the rest 
of us who enter this earthly life as newborn babies, they came into being 
with no clear understanding of good and evil. So what could it possibly
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mean, I would ask, to say that someone with no clear understanding of 
good and evil was nonetheless created morally upright? And what might 
it mean to say that such a person had a clear understanding of who God 
is, or to declare, as the Canons of Dort do, that Adam had "a true and sav­
ing knowledge of his Creator"?54 In the Genesis account, Adam and Eve 
certainly knew that some authority (a kind of parental figure, if you will) 
had commanded them not to eat the fruit from the tree in the middle of 
the garden; but like the children they were in all but appearance, they also 
confronted this command without any understanding of why they were 
required to obey it or why the command had been issued in the first place. 
It is as if God had simply told them, as loving parents sometimes do with 
immature children and in an effort to protect them from danger: "You 
must obey this command because I said so!" And like the children they 
were in all but appearance, their eyes were opened to their own imperfec­
tions or sinful propensities (the symbol for which in the story is their na- 
kedness)55 only after their emerging wills had already mired them in an act 
of disobedience. It therefore seems to me quite plausible for a Christian to 
think of this story not as an account of how human beings came to acquire 
a "sinful nature" in the first place, but rather as an account of how our first 
parents' natural propensity to "miss the mark" originally manifested itself 
in the context of ambiguity and illusion in which they first emerged.
Certainly the idea that Adam and Eve came into being with the same 
imperfections and egocentric dispositions common to human beings in 
general is no more philosophically problematic than the idea that an in­
herited sinful nature was God's supposedly just punishment of the human 
race as a whole for the sin of Adam and Eve. The idea that all humans 
beings, including Adam and Eve, begin life with the same imperfections 
and egocentric dispositions also seems to accord very well with Paul's 
magnificent vision of creation in two stages. As I have expressed this vi­
sion elsewhere:
The first Adam, according to Paul, 'was from the earth, a man of 
dust' and 'became a living being'; the second was not from the earth, 
but 'from heaven' and 'became a life-giving spirit' (I Cor. 15:45 and 
47). The first Adam thus represents the first stage in the creation of 
God's children: the emergence of individual human consciousness 
in a context of ambiguity, illusion, sin, and death; the second Adam, 
or Jesus Christ, represents the second stage: the divine power that 
successfully overcomes all sin and death and therefore all separation 
from God, so that the true Sons and Daughters, or the true creations 
of God, can emerge.56
Paul also made the following statement: "As was the man of dust, so are 
those who are of the dust,"57 and this at least suggests that Adam and 
his descendents ("those who are of the dust") all come into being in the 
same context of ambiguity, ignorance, and misperception and with similar 
dispositions and propensities. The Psalmist thus declared that the Lord 
"does not deal with us according to our sins, nor repay us according to our 
iniquities." Why not? Because "he knows how we were made; he remem­
bers that we are dust."58
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In any event, I find this vision of creation in two stages exceedingly sug­
gestive. God must first bring us into being as immature rational agents; 
then, once we are independent of God's direct causal control and our in­
cipient rationality begins functioning on its own, God can relate to us not 
merely as the Creator who designed us and certainly not as a manipula­
tive agent who controls all of our desires, beliefs, and judgments, but as 
a loving parent who works with us, guides us, and corrects us even as he 
permits us to learn valuable lessons from experience and from the con­
sequences of our actions. According to the Christian religion, moreover, 
love is the one power in the universe that transforms without manipu­
lating; hence, it is through sacrifice and acts of self-giving love that God 
will eventually transform us without manipulating us. And, of course, 
the supreme sacrifice, as Christians understand it, was God's Son having 
“emptied himself," having taken "the form of a slave," and having suf­
fered a humiliating death on a Cross59—though it was also, according to 
the author of Hebrews, the Son's triumph over death and the fear of it that 
enabled him to "free those who all their lives were held in slavery by the 
fear of death."60
Conclusion
If God is not the cause of sin and did not in effect program us to be sin­
ners, and if, according to Christian theology, we are all "by nature" sinners 
nonetheless, the question naturally arises concerning the best explanation 
for the near universality and seeming inevitability of human sin. In op­
position to the standard Augustinian explanation, which appeals to the 
corrupting effects of original sin on the human race as a whole, I have 
recommended that Christians consider, if only for the purpose of for­
mulating objections to it, the very different hypothesis that God had no 
choice, provided he wanted to create any persons at all, but to permit their 
embryonic minds to emerge in a context that virtually guarantees errone­
ous judgments and misguided choices of a kind that Christians typically 
associate with sin. I have no doubt that such a hypothesis will raise, as 
it should, many questions in the minds of thoughtful Christians—most 
notably questions about the nature of sin and one's responsibility for it. 
Once the questions are raised, the objections are formulated, and various 
replies are examined, perhaps then we will be in a better position to assess 
this alternative hypothesis in a reasonable way.61
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